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Abstract
The  paper  estjmates  a reaction function relating  the rate of growth  of the
Swiss  monetary  base  to a set of economic  stabiI  izalion objectives.
Econometrjc  results over quarterly data from 7966:2  -  1983:4  indicate the
state of the federal budget,  government  purchases,  the jnflation  rate and
the exchange  rate between  the Swiss  franc and  the Deutsche  mark  to be
significant  explanatory  variabies.  The  results suggest  that the monelary
base  contracts in response  to federal budge...  deficits  and  to infla!ion.
For government  purchases  and  lhe exchange  rate the response  is
accommodat  i  ve  --1-
1. Introduct'ion
Switzerland's  fjrst  constitutjon (  1848)  was  modeled  after  the first
Amerjcan  constitution,  and, as with the Unjted  States, the counLny's
federal  ist  character is  reflected in legislation  granting the central bank
a large degree  of formal independence  from government. Indeed,  the level
of autonomy  enjoyed  by the Swiss  National Bank  (SNB)  has  been  seen  as
perhaps  the greatest featured by any of the worldrs central banks  (Parkin
and  Bade,  1978,  1979).  As shown  in Table 1, Switzerland  also has  remajned
relatively  immune  from lhe inflationary  problems  experienced  by many
countries in recent years.  For the 1960-1983  period, Switzerland  comes
second  only to hlest  Germany  in a rankjng of the inflatjon  reconds  of 0ECD
countries.  However,  ther"e  is  very little  empir"ical  evidence  as to the
behavior  of the SNB,  and hence  the importance  of the price-stabi  lity  goal
has not been  quantified.l  This study seeks  to provide an objective
analysis of Swjss  monetary  poljcy that may  complement  the existing  studies
of the autonomous  central banks  in the United  States and  West  Germany  (see,
for  example,  Barth, Sickles and  l,/iest, 1982,  and  Willms. 1983).
2. Perspectives  on Central Bank  Independence
1n terrns  of the monetary  constitutions of the industrial ized nations,
Parkin and  Bade  (1978, 1979)  distinguish the SNB,  hiest  German  Bundesbank
and  the Federal  Reserve  System  as the three banks  that  are independent  of
government  jn the formulation of their  monetary  poiicy.  In the case  of
Switzerland, the role of the federa'l  government,  or Confedenation,  is
I im'ited  to  superv'i  sion and  approval  of  such  matters as the size of the
SNB's  capitai,  the denominations  of bank  notes, and  the share  of profits-t-
between  cantons.  The  Confederation  owns  no shares  in the SNB.  and stock is
held by the cantons,  cantonal  banks  and  the public.  Shares  are l'i  sted on
the Swi  ss stock exchange.
0f the three independent  central banks,  only in Switzer'land  and  West
Germany  does  the government  not have  full  power  in the appointment  of the
Governor  and  members  of the central bankrs  policy board.  In West  Germany,
the federal government  has  a djrect  input into the appointment  of not more
lhan ten members  of the twenty-one  member  Central Bank  Council.  0f  the
ten-member  policy board  of the SNB,  known  as the Bank  Committee,  only the
Chairman  and  Deputy  Chainman  are directly  appojnted  by the government.  The
remaining  appojntments  are made  by the Bank  Council, tvhich  consists of 40
members,  25 of whom  are appointed  by the government  cabinet to four-year
terms.  The  remaining  15  are elected by bank  stockholders.
Parkin and  Bade  (1979)  find  that  cross-country  compani  sons  of infIation
rates reveal that the lhfee countries with independent  central banks
experienced  lower average  inflation  rates over the 7972-7977  period than
did nine major countrjes  whose  central banks  are subservient  to government.
Moreover,  the SNB  and  Bundesbank  delivered a lower inflation  rate than the
Federal  Reserve,  whjch  is  seen  as featuring somewhat  less independence
ov/ing  to the Board  of Governors  being appoinled  entirely  by the executlve
t
branch.'  the 1972-1977  sample  itself  covered  available data on the
floating  exchange  rate perjod, with earlier  years being  excluded  jn view  of
the additional balance  of payments  cons+,raints  imposed  under  the fixed
exchange  rate era.
Empirical support  for  the jmportance  of central bank  autonomy  is
provided  by Banaian.  Laney  and  \^jillett (1983).  Their regression  results,-3-
based  on pooled  data from 17  countries, suggest  that central bank  autonomy
exerts an independent  effect  on the rate of inflation  even  after
controlling  for other factors.  A dummy  varjable representing  the
autonomous  central banks  was  negative  and significant  throughout  thejr
regres  si  on resul  ts.3
The  jmportance  of the price stabil'ity  objective,  in conjunction  wjth a
range  of other stabjl ization goals, is examined  in the analysis below.  The
focus here is  on the observed  response.by  the SNB  to movements  in the
inflation  rate.  It  is expected  that increases  in the inflation  rate wjll
lead to contractionary pol'icy  by the SNB. Such  a negative  response  to
inflation  was  found  to be of dominant  importance  fon West  Germany  by hlillms
(1983), wh'i 
'le 
rather more  fixed findings for  the Unjted States are present
in the ljterature  djscussed  by Barth, Sickles and  l{.iest  (1982).
3. The  Empi  ri cal Procedure
Swiss  monetary  policy is analyzed  using a reaction function to assess  the
empirical inportance  of a range  of pre-selected  stabiljzation  goa1s.
Fiscal policy variables are entered 'i  n the reaction function to capture  any
influence public finance considerations  may  have  on Lhe  central bank's
decision making. The  response  to the set of right-hand sjde variables js
measured  using the rate of growth  of the monetary  base  (DMB)  as the central
bank's poiicy instrument.4 The  monetary  policy feedback  rule has  the
general form gi  ven i  n (  1) below:
DMB  = f(DEF,  0G,  DP,  TB,  UN,  EX,  BP) (1)-4-
In this  equation, fi scal poi  icy variables compri  se DEF,  the federal
budget  deficit  divided by gross  domestic  product, and  DG,  the rate of
growth  of real governnent  purchases.5 The  goals of price,  interest  rate
and  employment  stabjlity  are represented  by series on the rate of growth  of
consumer  prices (DP), the three-month  deposit rate (TB) and  unemployment
(UN).  lnternational influences  are represented  by the exchange  rate
between  the Swiss  franc and  the Deutsche  mark  (EX) and  the balance  of
payments  (BP).
Assuming  that the SNB  does  not have  current information  on the state of
the economy,  each  of the above  variables must  be entered  with an appropiate
1ag  length.  Allowance  is  also made  for  lagged  values  of the monetary  base.
The  speci  f ic l  ag l  engths, whi  ch remai  n i  ndetermi  nate from  a iheoreti ca  l
perspectjve,  are determined  by applying  Akajkers  (1970)  mjnimum  final
prediction error (FPE)  crjterjon  t.o  the model  .  This procedure  aliows the
iag length for  each  rlght-hand side variable to differ,  and  is equivalent
to using an F-test with a varying significance level.  In thjs  case, the
maximum  1ag  length is  set at four quarters, and  each  of the right-hand side
variables is  then tested in turn with the lag length on the other variables
he  ld at the maximum.
The  estimation itself  is over quarterly data from i956:2 to 1983:4,
using ordinary least squares.6 Estimation  results  include those for  the
fixed and  floating  exchange  rate periods taken separately, as well as those
for  the fu1  1 samp  le.-5-
4. Empirical Results  for  Swjtzerland
Application of the model  to Switzerland  shows  the budget  deficit,
government  purchases,  the inflation  rate and  the exchange  rate with the
Deutsche  mark  to be selected  by the FPE  criterjon  over the fu11 samp1e.7
The  inclusion of the exchange  rate and  inf 
'lation 
variables accords  with the
stress placed  on these two objectives by Rich and  B69ue1jn  (1985).  The
extr  emely  favorable unemployment  figures for Switzer'land  may  well be a
factor accounting  for  the failure  of this  variable to be selected  by the
FPE  criterion.  Iloreover,  as in the case  of  1974-75,  any transjtory
unemployment  diffjculties  could be allev'iated  by reductions  in
Switzerland's large  migrant labor force.  The  importance  of  immigration
policy as a policy instrument  has  been  suggested  by Segalraan  (1986,  p.
108), who  states that "Swiss  policy on immigration  operates  almost  as if  it
vrere  control  led by a cal  ibrated spigot which  is  opened  only when  labor
shortages  exist  and  is  quickly shut when  Swiss  natives begin  to draw
excess'ive1y  on unemployment  compensation.rl
The  inclusion of the fiscal  policy variables suggests  that the SNB
takes at 
'least 
some  account  of the policy being pursued  by the government.
However,  the response  to the deficit  is  actually strongly negatjve,
implyirg that monetary  policy offsets,  rather than supports,  the directjon
of fiscal  policy.  This pattern of behavjor  may  well have  been  'influenced
by the fact  that the Swiss  federal budget  has  on the average  been  balanced
over the sample  period.  (At the mean  there is  a def  ic'it  equal to half a
percent  of GDP,  while at the median  there js a surplus equal to two tenths
of a percent  of GDP.) Certainly, the pressure  implied by the large anc
grov/ing  deficits  in countries such  as the Unjted States has  not been-b-
experi  enced  in Swi  tzerl and.8
The  significance of the var'iables  jn the Swiss  monetary  policy reaction
function is addressed  in Table  2.  Here,  the def  .icit.  inflation  and
exchange  rate variables are shown  to be signif.icant at the fjve  percent
1eve1,  while government  purchases  are at  least significant  at the ten
percent  I  evel  .
The  results presented  in Table 3 show  that there is  a Dositjve resDonse
of monetary  base  growth  to government  purchases  and  the exchange  rate,  and
negative  response  to budget  def.icits and  to  inflation.  Although  the
reaction to government  purchases  suggests  monetary  accomodation  of
increases  in  spending,  this  result actual  ly deals with the specific case  of
a balanced  budget  increase  in-  governmen.,  purchases  since the deficit  is
being held constant.  Anti-inr-lationary pol  icy i s evidenced  by the negative
coefficients on the inflation  variable, DP;  and  SNB  behavior  appears  to
reflect  the emphasis  gjven to the pric.e-stabiljty  objective in the ear'l  ier
discussjon  of central bank  independence.  The  net tendency  for expansion  in
the monetary  base  jn response  to a depreciation in the exchange  rate Iikeiy
reflects  attempts  by the SNB  to quel1 upward  pressure  on the Swiss  franc.
Upward  pressure  on the Swiss  franc led to the SNB  intervenjng to sell  Swjss
francs not only during the fixed exchange  rate era, but also during the
'late 
1970s  (see Schi  ltknecht, 1983).
Gjven  the importance  of exchange  rate effects  lo a sma'l  I  economy  such
as Switzerland,  a Chow  test was  used  jn order to allow for  a possibie
structural break  corresponding  with the adoption  of floating  exchange  rates
in January  1973. The  null  hypothesi  s of  stabjlity  across  exchange  rate
regimes  could be rejected at the ten percent level --  a surprisingly 1ow-t-
level of significance in v'iew  of the open  nature of the Swir, 
"aono.y.9 
So
as to deal with the possibil  ity  of a structural  shift,  the Swiss  monetary 
I
poiicy reaction function was  in any event re-estimated  over the separate
fixed exchange  rate (1966:2  -  1973:1)  and  floating  exchange  rate (1973:2  -
1983:4)  sub-samp1es.
Table  4 shows  that  in the brief  fixed exchange  rate sample,  only the
lagged  monetany  base,  the deficit  and  the exchange  rate are significant  at
the ten percent level or higher.  For lhe post-1973  sample,  government
purchases,  the jnfiation  rate and  the exchange  rate are signifjcant,  but
lhe deficit  is  not.  The  requirement  of ma'i  ntaining a fixed exchange  rate
may  explain the insignificance of the jnf'lation rate  in the pre-1973
sub-sample.  The  results in Table  5 indicate that the response  to  infl;tion
remains  uniformiy negatjve, however,  and  thi s response  i s certainly  highly
significant  (at  better lhan the one  percent 1eve1)  for  the post-1973
sample. The  effect  of the defjcjt  continues  to be negatjve.  For each
sub-sample  there js a marginal  tendency  for  the monetary  base  to expand  in
response  to a depreciatjon in the exchange  rate.  The  response  to
government  punchases  becomes  negatjve  for  the fixed exchange  rate sample,
but with an extremely  low level of significance.
5. Conclusions
Quantjfication of a countercyclical nesponse  to inflation  by the SNB
remains  the most  evident feature of the estimation results.  The  other
significant  explanatory  varjables jn the monetary  reactjon function v{ere  I
the exchange  rate with the Deutsche  mark, the deficit  and  the rate of
growth  of real government  purchases. The  results for  the deficit  suggest-8-
' 
,nat SNB  policy tends to offset  movements  in the federal budget.  Like the
r  importance  of the price-stability  objective, the apparent  response  to
fiscal  pof  icy represents  a pattern of behavior  that  supports  the formal
i  ndependence  of the SNB.West  Germany
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TABLE  3
Results  for the Swiss  Monetary  Policy Reaction  Functjon
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Note:  As in each  subsequent  case, three seasonal  dummies  were  included in
the regression  aiongside  Lhose  varjables I  jsted 'in the table.-  rl-
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Data  Sources  and  Defi  ni  t ions
The  TB,  UN  and  BP  data series  are taken  from  0ECD  (i984).  The  MBASE  and
PRICE  series  are ob'uained  from  the IFS  tape.  The  remaining  series  are oy
countesy  of the Swiss  Bundesamt  fijr Statistik (Bern,  Switzerland)  and  the
Swiss  National  Bank  (Zurich,  Switzerland).
(1)  Dt4B  = los (MBASE/MBASE(-1))
where  MBASE  is the monetary  base.
(z)  DEF  =.(-1 x BUDGET)/GDP
vhere  BUDGET  is the government  budget  surplus,
GDP  is gross  domestic  product.
(3)  DG = los (cov/G0v(-1))
where  GOV  is neal  governnent  and  social security  consumption.
(4)  DP = log (PRICE,zPRICE(-1))
where  PRICE  is the level of consumer  prices  (  1980  = 100).
(5)  UN  i  s the number  unemployed  itnousanas).
(6)  TB  is the three-month  deposit  rate (rnajor  banks,  Zurich).
(7)  EX  is the exchange  rate between  the Sh,iss  franc and  the Deutsche
marK.
(8)  BP  is the deficit on  the balance  of traoe.
The  only seasonally  adjusted  series  apart from  the national  accounts  data
is BP.-  15-
Notes
1.  Recent  SNB  policy is dj  scussed  by Rich and  B69uelin  (1985),
?-
?
Baltensperger  (1985)  and  Schiltknecht (1983).  0niy Rich  and  86guel  in
perform  empirical tests,  hov./ever,  and  here they focus on the tnonetary
base  and  M1  as competing  intermedjate  targets rather on than the
execution  of stabilization  policy per se.  Eisewhere,  Lusser  (1985)
compares  Swiss  and  \|lest  German  monetary  policy performance,  while Corti
(1983)  provides  an in-depth  analysis of Switzerland's  financial  system
and  money  markets.  There  is  to the best of my  knowledge  no publ  ished
reaction functjon study of Sv.liss  monetary  policy.
The  extent of the control is  iirnited, however,  by the very iong,
staggered 14-year terms that  are granted to  the members  of  the board.
In Banaian,  Laney  and  l{jllett  (1983), controll ing factors are
represented  by rates of growth.of per capita real gross  domestic
product  (GDP),  the Gini coefficient,  import shares  of GDP,  deficjts  as
a share  of  savings  and  union  membership  as a share  of the labor force.
The  independence  dummy  is defined for  Swjtzerland,  the United  States,
tdest  Germany  and  pre-1967  Canada. Further use of country-specific
dummies  showed  these to in each  case  have  the correct s'ign,  although
surpri  si  ngly Swj  tzerl andr  s estimated  reduct  ion i  n i  nfl  at'ion  was  not at
a1l significant  and  that of West  Germany  was  only margina11y  so.
The  monetary  base  was  officially  adopted  as an instrument  for
controlling  the gnowth  of |\41  in  1975,  and  received  further attentjon in
1980  when  jt  was  chosen  as the new  target variable.  SNB  emphasi  s on
the monetary  base  has  a much  earlier  origin,  however.  and  Schjltknecht-  16-
(  1983)  states that even in the fixed exchange  rate era the trend in the
monetary  base  was  regarded  as the best indjcator of monetary  ease  or
t'ightness.  lt4eanwhile,  the flswitch  to a floating  exchange  rate gave  the
Swiss  National Bank  virtually  fu11 control over the monetary  basetl
(  Schi  I  tknecht, 1983,  p. 73)  .
5.  This accords  with certain optimal public finance  considerations  raised
by Barro (  1979).
6.  It  should  be noted  that,  due  to the majority of the data not being
seasonal1y  adjusted, three seasonal  dummies  vere jncluded  in all
regressions  alongs'ide  the variables noted  in the text.
7.  Initial  application of the FPE  crjtenion also led to the TB  variable
'being 
selected  with a )tg  length of !hree.  However,  given that an
F-test showed  the variable not to be significant  even  a*.  the ten
percent level  , it  was  dnopped  from  the specification discussed  in the
rexL.  (  F. ..  = 1.91 ,  F,:r]:ical  = 2.20.  ) '5,32  (U..[UJ
8.  Al  lowance  was  also made  for an interactive effect  of the deficit  on Ene
response  to the stabilization  goals.  However,  while such  an
interactive  effect was  found  to be significant  for  the United States in
Burdekin  (1986) no such  effect was  found  to be present  in the
regnessions  for  Switzerland.
9.  The  result of the Chow  test vras  as follows:  F,,  ,^ = 1.69 ,  F,:r]:ical !+,+a  (u.lul
=  t-bt  --17  -
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